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Essay: 40th Anniversary of the
Gulf of Tonkin Incident
by John Prados
"...The particulars of the incidents of early August 1964, as reported by the
Johnson administration, were crucial to gaining the legislative authority
President Johnson sought, which came in the form of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
At the time and for some years afterward, the United States government took the
position that it had done nothing to provoke a naval engagement in the Tonkin
Gulf between North Vietnamese and U.S. warships. The Johnson administration also
maintained that it had acted with restraint, refusing to respond to an initial
North Vietnamese attack on August 2, 1964, and reacting only after North Vietnam
made a second naval attack two nights later. Both of these
assertions turned out to be misleading.
In fact the United States at the time was carrying out a
program of covert naval commando attacks against North Vietnam and had been
engaged in this effort since its approval by Johnson in January 1964.
(For documentation of this program, carried out under Operations Plan (OPLAN)
34-A, see the Tonkin Gulf subset of the National Security Archive's microfiche
collection, U.S. Policy in the Vietnam War, I: 1954-1968.)..." From
40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident by John Prados.
Đọc thông tin về sự kiện Vịnh Bắc bộ ở các địa chỉ dưới đây
http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/
http://www.millercenter.virginia.edu/
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